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the accumulated salary deductions representing the deceased
employee's contributions, plus interest, as without the exemption. (In re Nr;wton's Estate, 177 Misc. 877 [32 N.Y.S.2d
473]; In re Burtman's Estate, 180 Misc. 299 [41 N.Y.S.2d
778].) This distinction manifestly has no bearing under the
precise limitation of our statute in exempting "proceeds" of
an "insurance policy." If it is deemed desirable to exempt
from inheritance tax such payments as were made here under
city and state retirement plans, the Legislature should so
provide in unmistakably clear language.
The order is reYersed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor,
J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 19242.
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EMMETT R. BURNS, Petitioner, v. THE S'l'ATE BAR
OF CALil!-,ORNIA, Respondent.
[1] Attorneys- Disciplinary Proceedings- Review- Burden of
Proof.-In a proceeding to review the Board of Governors'
decision in disciplinary proceedings against an attorney, the
burden is on petitioner to show wherein the decision is
erroneous or unlawfuL (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6083.)
[2] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Evidence.-Findings of the
Board of Governors in a disciplinary proceeding that the
accused attorney commingled trust funds both with personal
funds and with trust funds of other clients and that he wilfully
appropriated his client's funds to his own usc are sustained
by evidence showing, among other things, that he did not
notify his client that a settlement had been made with respect
to a personal injury action, that he delayed unreasonably
turning over the settlement moneys to his client, and that
he allowed his wife to make use of the funds for their personal
purposes.
[3] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review.-Such contentions as
that the accused attorney is engaged solely in the trial of
personal injury litigation, that sueh practitioners are looked
at "askance," and that the "prosecutor'' was "of a large firm
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 127 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 175; [2] Attorneys,
§ 172(9); [3-6] Attorneys, § 174.
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re:[Jn;:;eucul~ the 'interests,' " anrl tlwt the Board of Governors
has no personal injury attorney as its member but all of them
represent clientele ''opposing" such practitioners present no
ground for setting aside a recommendation of the board for
disciplinary action, where they are based on matters outside
the record.
!d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review.-A disqualification of
members of the Board of Governors would not invalidate a
disciplinary proceeding before the local committee.
[5] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review.-Although in a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney the findings and recommendation of the local committee and the Board of Governors are aceorded great weight, they are not binding on
the Supreme Court which, on reviewing the recommendation
for suspension or disbarment, may pass on sufficiency of the
evidence, and which will disregard the recommendation when
it is disproportionate to the misconduct.
[6] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Punishment.-On review of a
recommendation by the Board of Governors that an attorney
be suspended from the practice of law for six months, it was
ordered that he be suspended for two years where his conduct,
and his evasive testimony before the board and the local committee, were not consistent with the high degree of fidelity
owed to his professional duties.

PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of suspension
of an attorney for six months. Petitioner suspended for
two years.
Emmett R. Burns, in pro. per., and Eugene H. 0 'Donnell
for Petitioner.
William E. Mussman and Garrett H. Elmore for Respondent.
THE COURT.-In response to a writ of review, the Board
of Governors of The State Bar has presented the record
of the proceeding which is the basis of its recommendation
that Emmett H. Burns be disciplined by suspension from
the practice of law for six months.
'l'he charges of professional misconduct grow out of Burns'
representation of John H. Crumley in a personal injury
action. Crumley engaged as his attorney one Sibbett, who
negotiated a settlement. Crumley rejected it and employed
Burns, who agreed with Sibbett to divide equally with him
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thr amount of the contingent fee after deduction of certain
costs.
A settlement was reached and Crumley executed a release.
Burns then received two checks in the aggregate amount of
$16.400, made payable to ".John Crumley and Emmett R.
Burns. his attornry." Pursuant to contractual authority,
Burns indorsed the checks with both names. On the following
day, the checks were deposited in a bank account to the
credit of "Alyce Burns or Emmett R. Bnrns Trustee Account.''
'fhe record includes evidence tending to prove these facts:
Crumley was not notified by Burns of the settlement. He
found out about it from another source about a month after
the checks had been delivered. During that time he had tried
unsuccessfully to find Burns at his officP. He tht>n went to
The State Bar and the district attorney and, on the advice
of the latter. sent a registered lett<>r of inquiry to Burns.
In it, he stated that he had eonsulted the district attorney,
that he had been ad vised that he should have been paid
within a few days after he signed tht> release and, if payment
were not made "within the n<'ar future," he would take
legal action.
A few days later Burns talked with Crumley by telephone
and said that the delay in payment was occasioned by the
press of litigation in another city. Burns also told Crumley
that he should not hav<> gone to the district attorney.
By agreement Burns and Crumley later met and discussed
the amount of the fee to be paid. Crumley then said that,
aceording to his understanding of the agreenwnts which had
bt'en mad<>. Sibbett was entitled to one-fourth of tbr amount
originally offered in settlement. Burns to reeeive one-third
of the difference between that amount and the one ultimately
areepted. Aceording to Burns. Crumley insisted he was
oblig·ated to pay only ont>-third of the difference between
these two amounts.
Burns rejected this proposal, stating that such an arrangement would be contrary to their written contract and also
to the one he had made with Sibbett. Because he had recently
moved his office, he told Crumley, his records were disarranged
and he was unable to product> copit>s of the agreements.
How<>ver, in Crumley's pr<>sence. he telephoned to Sibbett
who read to them from his copy of his contract with Burns.
Burns and Crmnl<'~' agreed to me<>t a week later at Sibbett 's office but Burns did not appear. A day or two after-

Oct.1955]

BuRKS v. S'rATE BAR

299

r45 C.2d 296; 288 P.2d 5141

ward, Crumley received a telephone call from Burns who
set a date for a later meeting. At that meeting he accepted
a pos1dated check of Burns for $12,000. However, before
the date of this check, Burns called him by telephone and
,;aid that the check had been made out improperly. He
asked Crumley to meet him a few days later to receive a
different one. In the meantime. said Burns, he would try
to get Sibbett to reduce his fee.
At their next meeting. Crumley accepted a postdated check
for $12,500, in exchange for the one he then held. Burns
told him that he would be notified when the money was in
the bank Before the date of this eheck. Crumley received
another telepl10ne call from Burns, who told him that there
was some question about the validity of thP check becausp it
had been written on a Sunday and he should exchange it
for another one. Crumley consulted thP bank in which he
had his account and was 11dvised that the check would be
honored if sufficient funds were on deposit. He placed it
with the bank for collection and it was paid. This was exactly
three months after Burns received thr money.
Other testimony in more detail may be summarized as
follows:
According to Burns. at their first meeting after the settlement was made, he offered to give Crumley his check for
$16,400, less costs, but Crumley refused to areept it. Crumley
denied that any snrh offer had been made to him. The record
shows that on the day Burns claims to have made the offer,
he had only $:39.86 to his credit in the bank.
Burns told the loeal committee that he gave Crumley only
one check, for $12/iOO and it was not postdated. He recalled
the date, he said. because Crumley had discussed with him
a purchase of cattle from a livestock shovY which was then
in progress. HowevPr. in the hearing befon the Board of
Governors. Bnrns was asked: '' 1£ vou had money available,
·why did you givr a post-rlnfrd chcdr'?" (Emphasis added.)
He explained that it was because he had not yrt cleared the
matter of SihbPtt 's fee. '"l'l;at was the whole thing. And
until that final point was settled f told him not to cash the
check, not to put it throng h." Again he was asked: ""\Vhy
did you on two occasions givr him post-dated checks if you
had money available?" ( Emplwsis added.) He replied:
"\Yell. the chrcks wPre givrn h:· lVfrs Burn~ An<l si <mrd by
her. At the time when the r:hccks were given to him the
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dispute with Sibbett had not been settled."
(Emphasis
added.)
In his testimony, Sibbett described the substitution of
attorneys and his fcc> arrangmnent with Burns and stated
that he first learned of the settlement about one week after
payment was made. He wrote to Burns about his share of'
the fee and inquired of him by
thereafter two or
three times at intervals of ''a month or two.'' W1JPn Bnrns
asked if he would consent to a reduction in fee, he said that
he would not be unreasonable. Later he and Burns each
agreed to reduce the amount of the fep providPd by thPir
contract. Sibbett was paid by Burns in cash five months
after the settlement was made.
Bank statements disclose that immediately prior to the
deposit by Burns of the check for $16,400. the balance of
the ''Alyce Burns or Emmett R. Burns 'l'rnstee Acconut ''
was $1,4 75.35. Within the next two and one-half months,
some 30 checks drawn on the account were paid. On thr
day of the deposit. the bank paid checks totalling $'1,350.
Within a week, withdrawals in rxeess of deposits had reduced
the balance to $5,504.20, and about two months later it had
fallen to $3.3n. Shortly thereafter Burns made two deposits.
one of $3.500 and another of $13,134. Burns told the Board
of Governors that the latter one was in thr form of a check.
but he did not know whether it was "a fee or repayment
of a loan or something like that.''
Burns testified that the settlement checks were deposited
by his wife, who acted as his bookkeeper and handled all of
his financial transactions; she ''knew where to deposit them.''
According to him. be had explained to his wife that the
purpose' of the trustee account was to receive settlement
moneys, which he considered to be trust funds. He said
that although he did not recall giving her specific instructions
that the balance of the aceount should never fall below the
aggregate of trust obligations, he directC'd her to use for their
pC'rsonal nPrds only money to which they were entitled.
However. Burns admitted that funds on deposit in his one
bank account were never segregated as to personal moneys
and trust funds or to his obligations to individual clients.
Money from all sources was deposited in the account, and
i'r'om it were withdrawn expenses of trial preparation, advances to clients and dislmrsenwnts for personal expenses.
No record was maintained which showed either aggregate
or individnal trnst obligations.
Burns claims to have kept at either his office or his home
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cash reserve fund of five or six tlwusand dollars, "in various
denominations." from which to advance costs of litigation
and "to be available for anything that might come up, any
reason f would have to pay for anything." At
one time, he said. it had been
in his office safe. but for
the five or six years
hearings it
was left at his home in a location deseribed variously as "in
the cash box in the filing eabinet-loeked filing eabinet," "the
file, into a drawer." and "in a room by itself. It's a room
with a locked door. It's in the bathroom. I have a cabinet.
It's a steel eabinet in a steel box, and it's behind a locked
uoor. ,,
The local committee found that Burns was guilty of "violations of Sections 610~~- 6067, 6068 and 6106 of the Business
and Professions Code" and rnle !I of the Rules of Professional
Conduct in that he appropriated for his own use funds belonging to Crumley and commingled those funds with his
own. By a vote of 10 to 5, the Board of Governors approved and adopted the findings of the local eommittee and
made the additional finding that the appropriation and eommingling were done wilfully, and that Burns wilfully failed
to report to Crumley his collection of the settlement moneys.
Thr board unanimously adopted the recommendation that
Burm be suspended from the practiee of law for six months.
[1] fn a procePding to review the board's decision, "the
burden is upon the petitioner to show wherein the decision
is erroneous or unlawful.'' (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6083;
Allww v. State Bar. 38 Ca1.2d 257, 258 [239 P.2d 871].)
Except for insinuations as to the integrity of the complaining
witness and of bias on the part of the members of the Board
of Governors, the brief presented by Burns in support of
his petition consists mamly of a general assertion that the
findings are unsupported. He contends that they ignore "the
real issue'' and disregard ''approximately ninety per cent
( 90%) of the testimony" ; but he does not state "the real
issue,'' and the testimony recited by him, which amounts
to only a small part of that presented, is entirely consistent
with the findings.
[2] The evidence, including Burns' own admissions, fully
sunports the conclusion that, contrary to rule 9 of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, 1 he commingled trust funds with
"'A member of the State Bar shall not commingle the money or
other property of a client with his own; and he shall promptly report
to the cHent the receipt by him of all money and other property belong·
ing to such elien t. "
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Peck v. State Bar, 217 Cal. 47, 51
[17 P.2d 112].) The record also fully supports the finding
that Burns wilfully appropriated his client's funds to his own
nse. One basis for such a finding is the evidence that he dda:ved
unreasonably turning- over the settlement moneys to Crumley.
(Cf. Price v. State Bar. 8 Cal.2d 201 [64 P.2d 727].) The
board might also haYe based its determination upon the conduct of Burns in allowing his wife to make usc of the funds for
their personal purposes. The evidence in that regard reasonably shows that Burns took undue advantage of his client.
(Of. Roark v. State Bar, 5 Cal.2d 665, 667 [55 P.2d 839];
Laney v. State Bar, 7 Cal.2d 419, 422 [GO P.2d 845]; Stanford
v. State Bar, 15 Cal.2d 721, 728 [104 P.2d 635].)
As excusing the delay, Burns contends tl1at during the
three-month period in which payment of the settlement money
was withheld, he was engaged extensively in the preparation
and trial of cases and that "the whole delay was over the
fee.'' But according- to his own testimony, he had no dispute
with Sibbett. The only controversy was with Crumley and
it arose in a conference between them more than six weeks
after the settlemE•nt checks had been received and deposited
by Burns in his account. In the meantime, Burns had used
his client's money for his own purposes, and the local committee was fully justified in disregarding the weak, evasive
and even conflicting testimony he gave in regard to large
amounts of cash assertedly kept at his home or office. It is
significant, in this connection, that the deposits made by
Burns to meet his postdated cheek to Crumley were by check
and not cash. Furthermore, it reasonably may be inferred
from his giving of postdated checks that Burns used this
means to gain the delay necessary for him to raise the money
which he had misappropriated.
In an effort apparently directed toward showing bias and
prejudice against him on the part of the members of the
Board of Governors, Burns makes these arguments : He is
engaged solely in the trial of personal injury litigation; such
prae:titioncrs, ''due to the insurance advertising,'' are looked
at "aRkance": the "prosecutor" was "of a large firm representing the 'interests' "; the board bas, he believes, no personal injury attorney as its member. but all of ihem renrcsent
clientele ''opposing'' such practitioners. In conelus.ion, he
argues that "the Court should know: 1. \vas Mr. Crumley
during these negotiations being advi;:ed by anyone in the
State Dar? 2. When did he go to the State Bar?''
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[3] 'l'hese contentions present no ground for setting aside
the recommendation of discipliuary action; all are based on
matters outside the record. [4] F'urthermore, neither before
the local committee nor before the Board of Governors did
Burns raise the question of bias ( cf. rule 15, Hules of Procedure of the State Bar) and if the issue had been raised,
it is doubtful whether d isqnalification would justify setting
aside the disciplinary proeeeding. ( Cf. Fish v. State Bar,
214 Cal. 215, 225 [ 4 P.2d 937] .) In any event, a disqualification of the board members would not invalidate the proceeding before the local committee. (Geibel v. 8fryfe Bar,
14 Cal.2d 144, 147 [93 P.2d 97] .)
As diseipline, thr local eommittee and the board recommended suspension from the practice of law for six months.
[5] Although in a disciplinary proceeding the findings of
fact and recommendation of these bodies are accorded great
weight, they ''are not binding upon this court, which upon
reviewing the recommendation for suspension or disbarment
may, and always does, pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence." (Fall v. State Bar, 25 Cal.2d 149, 159 [153 P.2d 1];
Clark v. State Bar, 89 Cal.2d 161 at 165 [2,16 P.2d 1].) This
eourt will disregard tlw rrcommendation when it is disproportionate to the misconduct. (F'lerning v. Stale Bar, 38
Cal.2d 841, 342 [2:39 P.2d 866]. 1
[6] Burns' conduct, his evasive testimony and lack of
candor before the board and the local committee are not consistent with the high degree of fidelity to his professional
duties owed by an attorney at law. In his behalf, it may
be said that he has been practicing since 1930; no prior
charges stand against him. His client suffered no nltimate
financial loss and the delay in making payment was only for
three months. Prom a consideration of all of these cireumstances we conclude that suspension from practice for a period
of two years will meet the ends of justiee.
The findings of the local committee and the board are fully
supported and are approved. It is ordered that Emmett R.
Burns be suspended from the praetice of law in this state
for a period of two years commencing 30 days after the filing
of this opinion.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
While I agree with the majority that the evidence is
sufficient to support the findings of the local administrative
committee and the Board of Governors that petitioner was
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guilty of unprofessional conduct in his dcaling8 with his
client Crumley I am disposed to agree with the discipline
recommended by both the administrative com mittce and the
Board of Governors of six mouths' suspension rather than
the two years' suspension fixed by the majority of this court.
This court has in numerous cases held that the local administrative committee is in a better position than either the
Board of Governors or this court to evaluate the evicknee
and arrive at a condusion as to what if any discipline should
be imposed upon a member of the bar who is guilty of unprofessional conduct (Browne v. State Bar, ante, p. 165 [287
P.2d 745] (September 28, 1955) ), and it seems appropriate to me that when the Board of Governors has approved
the discipline recommended by the local administrative committee, this court should accept such recommendation in cases
where the record is sufficient to justify discipline. I would
therefore suspend petitioner from the praetice of law for a
period of six months.
Petitioner's application for a hearing by the Supreme Court
was denied November 16, 1955, and the time for commeneement of the period of suspension was extended to begin
January 19, 1956. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the
application should be granted.

(S. F. No. 19337.
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CARL HEHSCHBL BONHAM, Appellant, v. 11'. BIUTTON
McCONNELL, as Insuranee Commissioner, etc., Respondent.
[lJ Insurance- Agents and Brokers- Licenses- Revocation.Under Ins. Code, § 1731, the Insurance Commissioner is vested

with discretion to revoke or suspend licenses and, while any
action taken by him may be judicially reviewed to determine
whether the charges on which it is based are supported by evidence, his decision regarding the appropriate penalty should
not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.
[2] !d.-Agents and Brokers-Licenses-Revocation.-With respect to revocation or suspension of licenses of an insurance
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Insurance, § 32.1.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Insurance, § 23,

